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INTRODUCTION
The right to free speech in public spaces is becoming irrelevant in
the United States. Americans are abandoning the traditional cities and
suburbs in favor of the exopolis, edge city, or simulated city-areas
which are characterized by private (often gated) common interest com-
munities, enclosed shopping malls, private parks, and office complexes,
and which have no sense of center. These shopping, recreation, and resi-
dential areas seek to simulate urban environments, only in a safer, more
t University of Montana, 1999. Cornell Law School, 2004.
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homogenized and more consumable form. The modern shopping center
is a reproduction of downtown shopping areas. Gated communities and
other common interest communities seek to recreate an idealized version
of residential areas. Mini-amusement parks simulate the community as-
pects of city parks, with the added thrills of scaled-down park rides and
the feeling of security provided by the exclusion of panhandlers and the
poor. To a large extent, these simulations have actually displaced the
areas they are intended to simulate. As the shopping malls and office
parks grow, downtown areas wither and die. As common interest com-
munities proliferate, urban communities are abandoned. As private parks
spread, city parks are left to an ever-expanding horde of homeless.
Local municipal governments control the downtown areas, city resi-
dential neighborhoods, and public parks that are being simulated. How-
ever, private interests, usually corporations, control the simulated
spaces-the shopping malls, the gated communities, and the private
parks. Because these simulated spaces are privately-owned and con-
trolled, owners regulate behavior within by exerting the most fundamen-
tal property right-the right to exclude. Thus, individuals may not
engage in speech activities unless the owner permits it.
Social and architectural critics have long recognized the problem
and have argued vigorously for a preservation of civic life. But there has
been no sign of reversal and no indication that Americans intend to
change their living patterns. In response, free speech advocates have
gone to the courts to extend speech rights into certain private spaces. In
a series of decisions in the 1960s, culminating with Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 1 the Supreme Court
recognized a speech right in shopping centers, which were the "func-
tional equivalent of a 'business block."' 2 Yet the Court soon began to
limit the decision and eventually overruled Logan Valley.3
However, the Court refused to rule out the possibility that statutes or
state constitutions might be interpreted to extend speech rights into shop-
ping centers. In its Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center decision,4 the
California Supreme Court became the first state court to rule that its state
constitution permits citizens to engage in expressive activities in shop-
ping centers. At least twenty-one states have examined the Robins deci-
sion, and several have extended their own constitutions to allow speech
rights in shopping centers. 5 Courts in California and New Jersey have
1 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
2 Id. at 325.
3 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1976).
4 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), affid 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
5 Jennifer Niles Coffin, Note, The United Mall of America: Free Speech, State Constitu-
tions, and the Growing Fortress of Private Property, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 615, 625-33
(2000).
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also extended limited free speech rights into gated communities. 6 The
rationale underlying these decisions presents the possibility that courts
might extend speech rights in to other forms of privately-owned public
spaces.
This note examines speech rights in simulated spaces and explores
possibilities for extending these rights. Part I defines simulated cities
and the free speech problems one encounters therein. Part II examines
the United States Supreme Court's approach to expressive conduct in
privately-owned public areas, including company towns, private parks,
and shopping malls, before it finally delegated to the states the responsi-
bility of protecting free speech in simulated spaces in PruneYard Shop-
ping Center v. Robins.7 Part III examines how the Court might handle
privately-owned "New Towns," gated communities, mega malls, and
amusement parks. Part IV details how individual states have extended
speech rights in shopping centers, gated communities, and condominium
complexes following California's Pruneyard experiment. Part V exam-
ines problems common to all the state approaches and suggests that
courts should not treat private property differently from government
property when determining whether a public forum exists.
I. OVERVIEW: DEMOCRACY AND SIMULATED CITIES
A. THE PURPOSE OF PUBLIC SPACE
Public space occupies a tremendously important place in any de-
mocracy as a forum for protest, discourse, and other political dialogue.
Streets "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, commu-
nicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."'8
Furthermore, "[p]ublic places are of necessity the locus for discussion of
public issues, as well as protest against arbitrary government action....
[I]n a free nation citizens must have the right to gather and speak with
other persons in public places." 9 Public spaces allow people of different
social classes and races to see one another and to interact. Grassroots
protest movements, which depend heavily on public space, have contrib-
uted far more to the expansion of rights in this country than has main-
stream politics.' 0
6 See Laguna Publ'g Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982); Guttenberg Taxpayers and Rentpayers Ass'n v. Galaxy Towers Condo. Ass'n, 688
A.2d 156 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996), affd 688 A.2d 108 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
7 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
8 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
9 Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
10 See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS & STEWART BURNS, A PEOPLE'S CHARTER 453-54
(1991)("Advances in rights have been achieved far more by grass-roots protesters, movement
2004]
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Public space is now in crisis. The traditional fora are being aban-
doned, leaving:
Cultural centers that are unable to support a good book-
store. Civic centers that are avoided by everyone but
bums, who have fewer choices of loitering place [sic]
than others. Commercial centers that are lackluster imi-
tations of standardized suburban chain-store shopping.
Promenades that go from no place to nowhere and have
no promenaders.I
In what Robert Reich calls the "secession of the successful," those Amer-
icans with the means to do so are largely abandoning public life for the
safety of entirely private institutions.' 2 The most important form of pub-
lic space has long been the marketplace.13 Through the first half of the
twentieth century, downtown areas in the centers of cities provided this
forum. 14 Between World War II and the 1970s, the marketplace gradu-
ally shifted to suburban shopping malls.' 5 And by the 1970s, the malls
activists, and bold leaders-such as Martin Luther King, Jr., and his cadres, the CIO militants
of the 1930s, and two centuries of women pathfinders-than by even the most well-meaning
political brokers of those days."). See also Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146
(1943) ("Door to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of
little people.").
11 JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 4 (Vintage Books
1992) (1961).
12 Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, (Magazine),
at 16.
The secession is taking several forms. In many cities and towns, the wealthy have in
effect withdrawn their dollars from the support of public spaces and institutions
shared by all and dedicated the savings to their own private services. As public
parks and playgrounds deteriorate, there is a proliferation of private health clubs,
golf clubs, tennis clubs, skating clubs and every other type of recreational associa-
tion in which costs are shared among members. Condominiums and the omnipresent
residential communities dun their members to undertake work that financially
strapped local governments can no longer afford to do well-maintaining roads,
mending sidewalks, pruning trees, repairing street lights, cleaning swimming pools,
paying for lifeguards and, notably, hiring security guards to protect life and property.
Id.
13 "[T]he marketplace had always been a public space, part of the fabric of the town,
usually at the heart of it, existing in continuity with the rest of town life. By the 1970s, when
malls started to multiply across the land, the public realm had been pretty much eliminated
from the American scene. Yet that hunger for public life remained. . . . What had existed
before in an organic state as Main Street, downtown shopping districts, town squares, hotel
lobbies, public gardens, saloons, museums, churches, was now standardized, simplified, sani-
tized, packaged, and relocated on the suburban fringe in the form of a mall." JAMES HOWARD
KUNSTLER, GEOGRAPHY OF NOWHERE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICA'S MAN-MADE
LANDSCAPE 119 (1993).
14 For a history of public space in the United States, see generally id.
15 See id. at 103-21; see also KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 246-71 (1985) (detailing the displacement of
downtown business districts in favor of shopping centers and suburban office space).
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almost completely displaced downtown areas as the primary place for
Americans to shop. 16 Today, many downtown areas are largely aban-
doned, leaving wastelands where true public speech is impossible.
17
B. PUBLIC SPACE AND THE SIMULATED CITY
Critics have used many names to describe the simulated
city,' 8  including exopolis,' 9  edge city, 20  postsuburb,21  cybur-
16 KUNSTLER, supra note 13, at 119.
17 See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 91 (1980) (Marshall, J., con-
curring) ("Rights of free expression become illusory when a State has operated in such a way
as to shut off effective channels of communication.").
Only the myopic magnifying lens of the television camera maintains the demonstra-
tion, march, and picketing as a modality of political expression; they have otherwise
faded into meaninglessness... with the shift of urban form and activity. These acts
and activities have been displaced over the past decade from the square and main
street to the windswept emptiness of City Hall Mall or Federal Building Plaza. To
encounter a ragtag mob of protesters in such places today renders them even more
pathetic, their marginality enforced by a physical displacement into so unimportant,
uninhabited, and unloved a civic location.
Trevor Boddy, Underground and Overhead: Building the Analogous City, in VARIATIONS ON A
THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE END OF PUBLIC SPACE 123, 125 (Michael
Sorkin ed., 1992).
18 Peter Halley coined the term "simulated city" to refer to suburban environments that
"simulate the phenomenon of the center." Peter Halley, Notes on Nostalgia, in PETER HALLEY
COLLECTED ESSAYS 1981-1987, 135 (Cheryl Epstein ed., 2000) (1988). This note uses the
term "simulated city" because it is the most similar to the legal idea that the public has the
same free speech entitlements in a privately-owned town that is functionally equivalent to a
municipality. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502-08 (1946).
19 Edward W. Soja, Inside Exopolis: Scenes from Orange County, in VARIATIONS ON A
THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE END OF PUBLIC SPACE 94, 95 (Michael
Sorkin ed., 1992).
20 JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER 4-8 (1991). Garreau em-
ploys a five-part definition for an edge city, which is any area that has: (1) at least 5 million
square feet of office space; (2) at least 600,000 square feet of leasable retail space or the
equivalent of a fair-sized mall; (3) more jobs than bedrooms, so that the population is larger
during the day than at night; (4) a public perception as being one place, so that it is a "regional
end destination for mixed use;" (5) had rapid growth, an area was not a "city" thirty years ago,
but rather a traditional suburb (mostly all residential) or farmland. Id. at 6-7. Garreau identi-
fied over 200 edge cities in the United States. For a list of the cities, see id. at 426-38.
21 Rob Kling et al., The Emergence of Postsuburbia: An Introduction, in POSTSUBURBAN
CALIFORNIA: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ORANGE COUNTY SINCE WORLD WAR II 1, 6 (Rob
Kling et al. eds., 1991).
[T]hese centers are functionally specialized and separated by travel times of from
fifteen-to-thirty minutes. People are likely to travel by automobile across city
boundaries for work, socializing, and shopping as much as within them.... Further,
such regions typically contain several centers with specific foci (such as shopping
and entertainment) that provide multiple attractions for many residents. Instead of
stores and residences being integrated into neighborhoods, or shopping being mixed
in with industrial workspaces, one will find in postsuburbia distinct and separable
centers-residential neighborhoods, shopping malls, and industrial parks.
Id. at ix.
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bia,22 and exurb. 23 Social critic Edward W. Soja perhaps best described
the form of the simulated city:
The metropolitan forms that have become so familiar to
us-with dominating downtowns, concentric rings of
land uses spreading out from the tightly packed inner
city to sprawling dormitory suburbs, density gradients
declining neatly from core to periphery-are now under-
going radical deconstruction and reconstitution, explod-
ing and coalescing today in multitudes of experimental
communities of tomorrow, in improbable cities where
centrality is virtually ubiquitous and the solid familiarity
of the urban melts into air.2 4
The centerless simulated city emulates familiar urban forms in what
many consider an improvement over city life: the simulations are ren-
dered safer, more homogenized, and more consumable.25 The simulated
city has enclosed malls instead of Main Street, gated communities in-
stead of neighborhoods, and campus-style industrial parks instead of
downtown office buildings. 26 Simulated cities are currently the fastest
growing communities in the United States.,27 and a substantial portion of
the American population already lives in such areas.2 8 Effectively, simu-
lated cities have no real public spaces. These simulated spaces that have
replaced the public spaces in urban environments are actually private
spaces which are almost indiscriminately open to the public.
22 Michael Sorkin, Introduction: Variations on a Theme Park, in VARIATIONS ON A
THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE END OF PUBLIC SPACE Xi, xii (Michael
Sorkin ed., 1992). Sorkin describes cyburbia as:
[A]n architecture of deception which, in its happy-face familiarity, constantly dis-
tances itself from the most fundamental realities. The architecture of this city is
almost purely semiotic, playing the game of grafted signification, theme-park build-
ing. Whether it represents generic historicity or generic modernity, such design is
based in the same calculus as advertising, the idea of pure imageability, oblivious to
the real needs and traditions of those who inhabit it.
Id. at xiv-xv.
23 Judy S. Davis et al., The New 'Burbs': The Exurbs and Their Implications for Plan-
ning Policy, 60 J. AM. PLANNING Ass'N. 45 (1994).
24 Soja, supra note 19, at 95.
25 See id. at 94-95 (describing Orange County as "a park-themed paradise, the American
Dream repetitively renewed and infinitely available.., to be encountered and consumed with
an almost endemic simultaneity").
26 See generally id.
27 Davis, supra note 23, at 45-46.
28 Although exact numbers are difficult to ascertain, due to the various differences in
definitions, it is estimated that 58.7 million Americans lived in exurban communities in 1990.
Id. at 46.
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1. Simulated Main Street
Shopping centers have largely replaced the traditional "business
block" in American downtowns as a marketplace and community
center.29 The 45,721 shopping centers in the United States account for
over half of all retail sales. 30 Malls have also shouldered widespread
community functions. Events at the Carousel Mall in Syracuse, New
York include fundraising for a local high school, a local youth program
soliciting volunteers, a beauty pageant, and a girl-scout cookie-eating
contest.3' The Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota has installed
facilities for thousands of walkers to keep track of mileage as they exer-
cise within the mall. 32 Other amenities offered by the Mall of America
include a full-service post office, a college campus, a wedding chapel, 33
and an alternative high school. 34 Newer malls are taking their commu-
nity function to even greater heights. In an incredible emulation of tradi-
tional town business districts, where people commonly lived above
businesses, some newer mega-malls are even including housing. 35 As
29 The shopping center industry itself has characterized shopping centers as "the new
downtown." Note, Private Abridgment of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J.
165, 168 n. 19 (1980) (quoting SHOPPING CENTER WORLD, Feb. 1972, at 52). Courts have also
placed great emphasis on the fact that shopping malls are displacing the traditional downtown.
See N.J. Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 774
(N.J. 1994) (recognizing the "total transformation of private property to the mirror image of a
downtown business district and beyond that, a replica of the community itself .... The re-
gional and community shopping centers have achieved their goal: they have become today's
downtown and to some extent their own community; their invitation has brought everyone
there for all purposes."); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley,
391 U.S. 308, 319 (1968) (recognizing that "the shopping center serves as the community
business block"); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 539 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("[T]he owner of the modem shopping center complex, by dedicating his property to public
use as a business district, to some extent displaces the 'State' from control of historical First
Amendment forums, and may acquire a virtual monopoly of places suitable for effective com-
munication."); see also KUNSTLER, supra note 13, at 119-20.
30 International Council of Shopping Centers, Did You Know? (2002), at http://
www.icsc.org/srch/about/DidYouKnow.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2003).
31 Carousel Center, News and Events (Jan. 19, 2002), at http://www.carouselcenter.coml
newslistEvents.asp (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
32 Eric Slater, JO-Year-Old Mall of America Discounts Doubters, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15,
2002, at Al.
33 Id.
34 BLOOMINGTON THOMAS JEFFERSON SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL, 2002-2003 REGISTRATION
GUIDE 48 (2002), available at http://www.bloomington.k12.mn.us/indschoovrJ/courses/JH-
SGuide48.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) (copy on file with author).
35 Matt Valley, The Remalling of America, NAT'L REAL EST. INVESTOR, May 1, 2002, at
4 (describing a mall renovation which will include the addition of 105 housing units); see also
The Early Show (CBS television broadcast, May 22, 2002) (copy of transcript on file with
author) (reporting on outdoor malls in North Carolina that look exactly like small town busi-
ness districts, including apartments above businesses).
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the New Jersey Supreme Court has observed, "malls are where the peo-
ple can be found today."'36
Popular culture has also begun to represent the community function
of malls. In the film Mall Rats,37 the mall had particular significance as
a community place where young people pass the time when they have
nothing else to do. Woody Allen used the shopping mall as a backdrop
for Scenes From a Mall,38 forgoing the usual ultra-urban New York City
background. Even the flesh-eating zombies in Dawn of the Dead seem
to have a vague recall of the community function the mall served as they
return there because of the "memory... [of] what they used to do. This
was an important place in their lives."'39
The creation of new community spaces is normally a happy event.
Yet the rise of malls as a public space has left the public at the mercy of
the mall owner's determination of what constitutes acceptable speech in-
side the mall. Recently, the issues relating to free speech in shopping
malls received a significant amount of media attention when massive
public protests accompanied the military buildup for war in Iraq. In up-
state New York, for example, a protest and widespread media coverage
followed after authorities arrested a man for wearing a t-shirt which read
"Give Peace a Chance" inside a shopping mall.40 Reactions to the arrest
were highly emotional. One commentator on MSNBC even suggested
that a swastika should be painted on the exterior of the mall.41 Following
the arrest, a crowd of 100 people gathered in the mall to protest the mall
policy.42 Although often less public, the peace movement has had other
incidents that demonstrate the frustration encountered when attempting
to publicly voice its message in community space that is controlled by
36 N. J. Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d. 757,
767 (1994).
37 MALLRATS (Universal Studios 1995).
38 SCENES FROM A MALL (Buena Vista 1991).
39 DAWN OF THE DEAD (Anchor Bay Entertainment 1979).
40 For the original story, see Carol DeMare, He Kept His Shirt On-and Got Arrested,
TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), March 5, 2003, at Bl. The story quickly gained national and
international attention. See, e.g. Conor O'Clery, First Amendment to the Rescue as Shopping
Malls and Cheney Get Shirty, IRISH TIMES, March 8, 2003, at 13; Short Wave, Sunday Times
(South Africa), March 9, 2003, at Leisure and Lifestyle 4, available at http://
www.sundaytimes.co.za/2003/03/09/lifestyle/lifel8.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
41 Bill Press suggested this. Pat Buchanan replied that the mall is private property and
should have the right to expel whomever they wish. Press asked Buchanan if the mall should
be able to expel shoppers who read a Bible in the mall. Buchanan replied, "Private-private
property!" Countdown: Iraq (MSNBC television broadcast March 5, 2003) (copy of transcript
on file with author). An editorial in a Tampa, Florida newspaper compared the mall owners to
"jackbooted storm troopers." Daniel Ruth, You Can Take The Peace Stuff Only So Far,
TAMPA TRmB., March 10, 2003, at Nation/World 2.
42 Countdown: Iraq, supra note 41.
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private shopping malls.43 One commentator has suggested that the atten-
tion heaped upon this incident is a result of the fact that Americans do
not realize that they waive significant constitutional rights upon entering
a shopping mall.44
Even when clothing does not display a controversial political mes-
sage, shopping malls routinely expel shoppers for their attire. An article
in the online magazine Salon details the growing trend of malls forbid-
ding shoppers from wearing "gang related" clothing while on the prem-
ises.45 One St. Louis area mall even expelled rap star Nelly from mall
property for wearing a "do-rag," which was an item of clothing the
mall's dress code expressly forbade. 46 Because it is exceedingly difficult
to tell exactly what gang clothing is, the real purpose of the policy ap-
pears to be to give mall security carte blanche to expel black youths
from mall premises, rather than to prevent gang activity. 47 Some critics
agree, charging that the anti-gang clothing policies are actually a form of
"ethnic cleansing" aimed at young black males.48
2. Simulated Neigborhoods
Gated communities and other common interest communities are
largely replacing the traditional city neighborhood. Gated communities
vary in size and form, with some developments containing only a few
dozen units, while others have several thousand. 49 In some areas, gated
communities are becoming more common than un-gated developments.
For example, in a recent poll in south Orange County, California, 48
percent of respondents indicated that they lived in a gated community,
and 62 percent expressed a desire to live in a gated community.50 Na-
tionally, 27.4 percent of the population would like to live in a gated com-
43 Maria Allwine, Peace Protestors Arrested and Detained in Baltimore Suburb, BuzzF-
LASH.COM, March 4, 2003, at http://www.buzzflash.com/contributors/03/03/04-protest.html
(last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
44 See O'Clery, supra note 40. Several others have expressed confusion over why First
Amendment rights are not protected in shopping malls. See, e.g., Countdown: Iraq, supra note
41; Lance Morrow, The Right to Wear T-Shirts: Let's Not Trample the Constitution in Our
March Against Terrorism, TIME, Mar. 17, 2003, at 90.
45 Any Benfer, Policing Gangsta Fashion, SALON.COM, May 29, 2002, at http://
www.salon.com/mwt/feature/2002/05/29/nelly/print.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2003) (copy on
file with author).
46 Id. A do-rag fits in the mall's prohibited category of "commonly known gang-related
paraphernalia," which includes but is not limited to "wearing or showing a bandana or do rag
of any color, a hat tilted or turned to the side, a single sleeve or pant leg pulled/rolled up and
flashing gang signs." Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Jim Radcliffe, Owner of Coto Store Faces Resistance on Expansion, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., Jan. 18, 2002, at 1.
50 Stephen Lynch, Is Gated Dated?, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Nov. 4, 2001, at Accent 1.
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munity.51 More than 8.5 million Americans reside in one of the
estimated 20,000 gated communities nationwide. 52 Including gated com-
munities, in 1992, 32 million Americans lived in a private community in
which a homeowner's association owns the roads, sidewalks and parks.53
The people who move into these gated communities are often seeking a
greater sense of community and profess a desire to return to small town
values.54
II. EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT ON PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
The right to exclude is one of the most fundamental of all property
rights. 55 Yet the state also may regulate property, so long as that regula-
tion does not result in a "taking" of the property, whereby the state,
through excessive regulation, effectively occupies the property. 56 The
state routinely exercises its power to regulate private property through
such devices as zoning laws and environmental regulation. 57 The Su-
preme Court has held that the Constitution provides that, where private
property is the functional equivalent of a municipality, the public shall
have a free speech right on that property. 58
A. THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF A MUNICIPALITY
When a private entity undertakes a function that is municipal in na-
ture, the courts will consider the entity to be a "state actor."'59 As such,
the private entity must not impose restrictions that interfere with the pub-
lic's constitutional rights. This "functional equivalent" doctrine grows
out of the 1946 Supreme Court case Marsh v. Alabama.60 In Marsh, the
appellant entered the privately owned company town of Chickasaw, Ala-
bama and distributed religious literature on a street corner.61 The com-
pany did not permit solicitation of any kind, and the appellant was
51 Id.
52 Ray Tessler & David Reyes, 2 O.C. Gated Communities are Latest to Seek Cityhood,
L.A. TIMES (Orange County Edition), Jan. 25, 1999, at Al.
53 Frank Askin, The Privatization of Public Space and Its Impact on Free Speech, N.J.
LAWYER, June 1997, at 12, .
54 EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED COMMUNI-
TIES IN THE UNITED STATES 29-45 (1997).
55 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
56 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
57 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (establishing
the constitutional validity of zoning regulations).
58 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1946).
59 See id. at 506-08.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 502-03.
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arrested and charged with trespassing. 62 The Court held that the pri-
vately-controlled town was a state actor because it was the functional
equivalent of a municipality.63 Chickasaw appeared to be a town just
like any other, 64 with no barriers denying the public's full and complete
access to the town.65 As a state actor, the company town was bound to
respect the public's First Amendment rights, just as any government ac-
tor would, and therefore had to respect the public's right to freedom of
expression in the town.66 The Court reasoned that the more that private
owners open up their property for the public, the more their rights be-
come circumscribed by those who use the property. 67 Furthermore, the
Court held that the First Amendment right applied not only to those who
enter the town to engage in expressive activity, but also to those individ-
uals living in company towns who have the right to be informed through
uncensored information. 68
In 1966, Evans v. Newton 69 extended the Marsh holding to include
privately-run parks. Senator Augustus 0. Bacon left property in Macon,
Georgia to be operated in trust as a park (by a private trustee) with the
proviso that only whites could use the park.70 The Court held that the
privately-owned park should be treated as if it were owned by a state
actor because the functions of the park were "municipal in nature" and a
park "traditionally serves the community."'71 Thus, enforcement of the
whites-only rule at the park would violate the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 72 Justice Rehnquist later clarified this hold-
ing in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks,73 where he indicated that parks intended for
purely recreational purposes-presumably places such as Six Flags or
Disney World-would not qualify as state actors.74
Two years after Evans, the Supreme Court decided Amalgamated
Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,75 the high-
water mark for the Court's state actor cases. In Logan Valley, the Court
extended the Marsh holding to include shopping malls, reasoning that
large shopping malls are the functional equivalent of downtown business
62 Id. at 503-04.
63 Id. at 507-09.
64 Id. at 502-03, 506-09.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 507-09.
67 Id. at 506.
68 Id. at 508-09.
69 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
70 Id. at 297.
71 Id. at 301-02.
72 Id. at 302.
73 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
74 Id. at 159 n.8.
75 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
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districts. 76 The Court rejected the defendant's contention that title to the
property gave the mall the right to exclude those who engaged in activi-
ties of which the mall did not approve. 77 The Court reasoned that, unlike
an individual's home, operating a space where the public was permitted
to freely gather entailed no privacy interest, and thus there was no blan-
ket right to exclude. 78
The holdings in Logan Valley and Evans permitted courts to con-
ceptually divide cities. If a private interest simulated a public space,
thereby creating a "functional equivalent" of a traditionally public area (a
business district in Logan Valley and a park in Evans), the owner of that
property would lose much of his power to exclude individuals. 79 This
permitted courts to apply the rule in a far greater variety of situations
than would have been permitted under a narrow reading of Marsh, where
individuals living in a private company town enjoy First Amendment
rights only if a single private interest owns and simulates the entire town.
Justice Black, who authored the Marsh opinion, dissented in Logan Val-
ley, arguing:
I think it is fair to say that the basis on which the Marsh
decision rested was that the property involved encom-
passed an area that for all practical purposes had been
turned into a town; the area had all the attributes of a
town and was exactly like any other town in Alabama. I
can find very little resemblance between the shopping
center involved in this case and Chickasaw, Alabama.
There are no homes, there is no sewage disposal plant,
there is not even a post office on this private property
which the Court now considers the equivalent of a
"town."80
In short, Justice Black wanted to limit the Marsh rule to situations that
were factually identical to Marsh.
The Court soon began to reduce the broad scope of the state actor
rule. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,8' the Court examined the rights of people
who, in a large shopping mall in Oregon, distributed handbills protesting
76 Id. at 319.
77 Id. at 324.
78 Id.
79 See id. at 319-20 (holding that when a "shopping center serves as the community
business block" and is accessible and open to the public, the owners cannot exclude the pub-
lic's exercise of First Amendment rights "on the premises in a manner and for a purpose
generally consonant with the use to which the property is actually put"); Evans v. Newton, 382
U S. 296, 302 (1966) ("the public character of this park requires that it be treated as a public
institution").
80 Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 331 (Black, J., dissenting).
81 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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the Vietnam War. The Court held that the anti-war protesters had no
general right to conduct expressive activity in the shopping mall. 82 It
distinguished Lloyd from Logan on the basis that the speech in Logan
involved labor issues relating directly to a business within the shopping
mall.83 The Court preserved the right to engage in expressive activity in
shopping centers where it related directly to shopping center opera-
tions. 84 Thus, the public would be free to speak on issues relating to
employment, sales, or environmental practices of a particular business
within the shopping center, but the shopping center could no longer be
considered a generally open public forum.
The Supreme Court destroyed what was left of Logan four years
later with its holding in Hudgens v. NLRB.85 The Court essentially nar-
rowed the Marsh holding to situations in which the entity in question
undertakes all of the responsibilities of a municipality. 86 To be deemed a
state actor, the area must include "residential buildings, streets, a system
of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a 'business block' on which busi-
ness places are situated."' 87 Thus, the Court overruled Logan and re-
stricted the Marsh holding to cases in which the factual circumstances
are virtually identical to those in Marsh.
B. MARSH AND THE SIMULATED CITY
However, given the continuous suburbanization in the United
States, which has occurred since the Court decided Hudgens, evolving
social change may merit reconsideration of the shopping center as a state
actor.88 In 2001, shopping centers accounted for over half of the nation's
retail business. 89 However, shopping malls were a relatively new and
novel phenomenon when the Supreme Court refused to recognize free
speech rights in shopping centers. When the Court decided Lloyd in
1972, it described the shopping center as follows:
82 Id. at 563-64.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
86 Id. at 513-14, 539.
87 Id. at 516 (quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946)). In his dissent,
Justice Marshall argued that:
The underlying concern in Marsh was that traditional public channels of communi-
cation remain free, regardless of the incidence of ownership. Given that concern, the
crucial fact in Marsh was that the company owned the traditional forums essential
for effective communication; it was immaterial that the company also owned a sewer
system and that its property in other respects resembled a town.
Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 539 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88 See KUNSTLER, supra note 13, at 117-21; JACKSON, supra note 15, at 257-61.
89 International Council of Shopping Centers, supra note 30.
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The Center embodies a relatively new concept in shop-
ping center design. The stores are all located within a
single large, multi-level building complex sometimes re-
ferred to as the "Mall." Within this complex, in addition
to the stores, there are parking facilities, malls, private
sidewalks, stairways, escalators, gardens, an auditorium,
and a skating rink. Some of the stores open directly on
the outside public sidewalks, but most open on the inte-
rior privately owned malls. Some stores open on both.
There are no public streets or public sidewalks within
the building complex, which is enclosed and entirely
covered except for the landscaped portions of some of
the interior malls. 90
At the time of the Lloyd and Hudgens decisions, the process of de-
cay in the nation's downtown areas had only just begun. Now the pro-
cess has long been completed, but the state actor rule has remained the
same. And many communities throughout the country lack an effective
area where one can publicly engage in expressive conduct. 91
Hudgens restricts the Marsh holding to situations where a private
entity has essentially constructed an entire town. 92 But the Court's defi-
nition rests upon an anachronistic conception of towns, which is best
suited to pre-World War II America. Few towns in the exopolis have
"residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal
plant and a 'business block' on which business places are situated"93
together as a distinct unit. In the simulated cities, one can fully observe
how constraining this holding has been; in the world of shopping malls,
common interest communities, and corporate industrial parks, citizens
are left with nowhere to engage others freely in social and political dis-
course. Even where one does not wish to exercise this right, one is still
deprived of the opportunity to be engaged by others. 94
The new mega-malls may present a compelling argument to extend
the reach of Marsh. Consider the Mall of America in Bloomington, Min-
nesota, which has a post office, a university, a wedding chapel, and a
private security force to keep order.95 If one holds to the narrow defini-
tion of town in Hudgens, the Mall of America almost certainly will not
90 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 553 (1972).
91 See generally KUNSTLER, supra note 13, JACKSON, supra note 15.
92 See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 516, 539.
93 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).
94 Id. at 508. The responsibilities of citizenship require that citizens must "be informed.
In order to enable them to be properly informed their information must be uncensored." Id.
95 Slater, supra note 32.
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be considered a state actor.96 After all, it has no streets, nor any residen-
tial buildings.
Some newer malls are adding residential units to their design. 97 It
remains to be seen how this new phenomenon will affect the Court's
analysis. It does seem to add the key ingredient missing from the
Hudgens requirements for state actors. However, technically there are
still no streets inside most mega-malls. Also, their amusement park-like
nature might work against characterizing them as state actors, consider-
ing Justice Rehnquist's footnote comment in Flagg Bros., where he ad-
vises that parks intended for purely recreational purposes are not
municipal in nature. 98
If there remains any current phenomenon that clearly will still be
controlled by Marsh, the "New Towns" in Florida and elsewhere likely
qualify. 99 Celebration, Florida is the most commonly known "New
Town." The Disney Corporation designed and constructed Celebration
based on the tenants of New Urbanism, a planning philosophy that en-
courages pedestrian-friendly streets, strong downtown business districts,
and old-style front porches. 00 Disney and the Celebration homeowners
association own the common areas of the town.101 Celebration is not an
incorporated city, even though its population will eventually hit 20,000,
and its physical appearance resembles a city in every significant way.102
One way in which it differs substantially from a city is its lack of a
municipal government. 103 Instead, a homeowners association, in which
each resident can participate, controls the administration of the town
along with Disney.104 The Disney Corporation is given final veto power
over all decisions. 105 If the courts were to refuse to characterize Celebra-
tion as a state actor, the citizens of that town would have little recourse
96 The Minnesota Supreme Court has refused to take an expansive view of First Amend-
ment rights in the Mall of America. See Minnesota v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793 (Minn.
1999) (holding that Mall of America is not a state actor).
97 See supra note 35.
98 436 U.S. 149, 159 n.8 (1978). But one could make the argument that existing public
space is also becoming more like amusement parks--consider Times Square in New York and
the main public areas in Las Vegas.
99 For the purposes of illustration I will focus on Celebration, Florida, which is the most
famous new town. However, there are at least a half-dozen other new towns in the United
States, including Kentlands, Maryland, Seaside, Florida (which served as the set for the film
THE TRUMAN SHOW (Paramount 1998)), and Columbia, Missouri. All are privately owned.
100 Michael Pollan, Town-Building Is No Mickey Mouse Operation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
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against corporate form of government the Disney Corporation has
established. 106
Of course, Celebration is not exactly a company town. Two possi-
ble distinctions between Celebration and Chickasaw (the "town" at issue
in Marsh) are evident. First, the common areas of Celebration are owned
by a corporation (the homeowners association) which is in turn owned in
common by the residents of Celebration. Thus, unlike Chickasaw, the
town is owned by its residents, not by a third party. Second, the re-
sidents of Celebration actually own their own homes, whereas in Chicka-
saw the corporation owned the homes as well as the common areas.
However, both of these arguments should ultimately fail. While the
common areas are owned in common, Disney holds an unqualified veto
power, effectively giving them complete discretion over how the town is
controlled. Also, the weight of the individual homeownership factor is
diminished somewhat by the high degree of control asserted by Disney
and the homeowners association, including authority to determine per-
missible types of shrubbery, house exterior colors, and the limitation on
political signs. 10 7
Gated communities likely fall outside the scope of Marsh, as inter-
preted under Hudgens. Gated communities commonly include club-
houses, golf courses, parks, private schools and other similar
amenities. 10 8 However, there does not seem to be any communities that
include full business districts inside the gates. Even Coto de Caza, an
Orange County gated community of 13,000 residents, only has one small
general store inside the gates. '0 9 So, as similar as gated communities are
to towns, the Hudgens requirement that an entity possess all the attrib-
106 See id..
It may be Disney's boldest innovation at Celebration to have established a rather
novel form of democracy, one that is based on consumerist, rather than republican,
principles. For many of the people I met at Celebration, the measure of democracy
is not self-rule but responsiveness-they're prepared to surrender power over their
lives to a corporation as long as that corporation remains sensitive to their needs.
This is the streamlined, focus-grouped responsiveness of the marketplace, rather than
the much rougher responsiveness of elected government-which for many Ameri-
cans was discredited a long time ago. Of course, the consumerist democracy holds
only as long as the interests of the corporation and the consumer are one. So far, this
has largely been the case, if only because all the community's "stakeholders" have
dedicated themselves to the proposition of maintaining high property values-which
is one way, I suppose, to define the public interest.
Id.
107 Id. Celebration limits political signs on front yards to one 18'x24' sign posted no
more than 45 days before an election. Id.
108 BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 54, at 1-29.
109 See Radcliffe, supra note 49.
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utes of a municipality will likely preclude gated communities from being
characterized as state actors. "10
Another interesting trend is the popularity of mini-amusement parks
as a gathering place for teenagers. Especially in the post-suburban world
of Orange County where "cities often have no center and parks often
have no jungle gyms, places like Boomers [a mini-amusement park] have
become the de facto hangout for a Saturday afternoon or weekday eve-
ning."' One park owner went so far as to say, "We're a community
center, a local gathering place." ' 1 2 It seems that while parks may start as
purely recreational places, they may evolve into something more. How-
ever, it seems highly unlikely that the Court would protect the exercise of
First Amendment rights on these properties.
III. PROGRESSIVE STATE MODELS
Although the Court has not reconsidered its holding in Hudgens, it
further developed its shopping mall jurisprudence in PruneYard Shop-
ping Center v. Robins. 113 The California Supreme Court had held that
the free speech provision in the California constitution provides greater
rights than under the federal constitution and granted Californians an ex-
pressive right in shopping centers.' 14 In PruneYard, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the California Supreme Court's decision and con-
cluded that compelling a shopping center owner to permit expressive
conduct: (1) did not result in an unconstitutional taking; 115 and (2) did
not violate the shopping center owner's First Amendment rights.16
Thus, states were left free to expand their own constitutional protection
of freedom of speech to include shopping centers.' 17
A. CALIFORNIA
California was the first state to recognize a right to expressive con-
duct in shopping centers after the Supreme Court decided Hudgens.118
The PruneYard case arose after a shopping center ejected high school
' "0 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 516, 539 (1976).
S1 1 Stephen Lynch, O.C. Trends: The New Downtowns for Kids, ORANGE CouNTY REG.,
July 14, 2002, at 1.
112 Id.
113 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
114 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979).
115 PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82-85. For criticism of the takings aspect of PruneYard, see
Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v Robbins, 64
U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (1997). For a critique of Epstein's argument, see Frank Michelman, The
Common Law Baseline and Restitution for the Lost Commons: A Reply to Professor Epstein,
64 UCHI. L. REV. 57 (1997).
116 PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 85-88.
117 See Coffin, supra note 5, at 624.
118 See Robins, 592 P.2d at 344, 350-51
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students who were attempting to gather signatures for a petition urging
the United States to oppose a U.N. resolution against Zionism. 119 Al-
though the students did not create a disturbance and were generally well
received by shoppers, mall security guards informed them that mall regu-
lations forbade them from engaging in political activity on mall prem-
ises. 120 The students were left with few alternative venues in which to
seek signatures for their petition, given that shopping centers had effec-
tively replaced city centers as the main place for public gatherings in the
San Jose area, where the PruneYard Shopping Center was located.
12 1
The Court held (1) that Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner 122 did not give shopping
mall owners the absolute property right to eject the public from the shop-
ping center, and (2) that the California constitution afforded people in
California greater free speech rights than under the Federal Constitu-
tion.123 The Court reasoned that First Amendment rights must evolve to
cope with changing patterns of development. 124 To a large extent, the
Court stated, First Amendment rights exist where the public openly and
freely gathers. 125 Furthermore, the Court indicated that the California
constitution envisions strong citizen activity through the use of referen-
dum, recall, and initiative. 126 According to the Court, this high level of
grassroots citizen activity envisioned by the California constitution fur-
ther justified the state's use of the its police power to regulate private
property to protect political speech. 127
Free speech advocates have argued that the rule should be expanded
to include stand-alone suburban retailers, but the courts have held that
1 19 Id. at 342.
120 Id.
121 See id. at 345. The court cites incredible statistics:
Evidence submitted by appellants in this case helps dramatize the potential impact of
the public forums sought here: (1) As of 1970, 92.2 percent of the county's popula-
tion lived outside the central San Jose planning area in suburban or rural communi-
ties. (2) From 1960 to 1970 central San Jose experienced a 4.7 percent decrease in
population as compared with an overall 67 percent increase for the 19 north county
planning areas. (3) Retail sales in the central business district declined to such an
extent that statistics have not been kept since 1973. In 1972 that district accounted
for only 4.67 percent of the county's total retail sales. (4) In a given 30-day period
between October 1974 and July 1975 adults making one or more shopping trips to
the 15 largest shopping centers in the metropolitan San Jose statistical area totaled
685,000 out of 788,000 adults living within that area. (5) The largest segment of the
county's population is likely to spend the most significant amount of its time in
suburban areas where its needs and wants are satisfied; and shopping centers provide
the location, goods, and services to satisfy those needs and wants.
Id.
122 407 U.S. 551 (1974).
123 Robins, 592 P.2d at 344-45.
124 Id. at 346-47.
125 See id.
126 Id. at 345-46.
127 See id.
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PruneYard does not extend the public's free speech rights to such ar-
eas.1 28 However, the courts have refused to free all stand-alone retailers
from having any obligation to allow for expressive conduct. 2 9 The court
in Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, for instance, held that
there is no bright-line test and, instead, courts must balance private prop-
erty rights with public rights. 130 Factors to consider include the extent to
which the public is invited to congregate at the property and the extent to
which the property adopts a "public character." 13' Thus, Trader Joe's, a
grocery store, can restrict free speech because it invites the public to its
establishment purely for the purpose of shopping, unlike the collection of
stores in a shopping center, which generally invite the public to gather. ' 32
Courts have also refused to extend PruneYard restriction to big-box re-
tailers, even where there is a complex of connected stores. 133
Although the California courts have been highly liberal in finding a
right to political speech in shopping centers, they have also been gener-
ally compliant in allowing shopping centers to limit speech through the
use of "time, place, and manner" restrictions. Courts commonly allow
such restrictions under First Amendment jurisprudence.' 34 Speech re-
strictions in a traditional downtown public forum are only permissible
"provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative chan-
nels for communication of the information."'' 35 In the context of shop-
ping centers, the courts have recognized the owner's property rights and
engage in a balancing test, which ultimately ends in restrictions on ex-
pressive rights in shopping malls that are far greater than those allowed
in downtown business districts. In Union of Needletrades v. Superior
Court,'36 for instance, a California appeals court upheld several mall
owners' highly restrictive free speech rules, including: designating small
areas of the shopping center as expressive zones and forbidding expres-
sive activities outside those zones; 137 "blackout periods," extending from
128 Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999).
129 Id. at 448-49.
130 Id. at 448-52.
131 Id. at 449.
132 Id. at 448-51.
133 See Slevin v. Home Depot, 120 F. Supp. 2d 822 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that a
Home Depot store, even when connected to a Staples, did not constitute a public forum under
Prune Yard).
134 See generally Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1988).
135 Id at 293. See also LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 981-82 (2d
ed. 1988).
136 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
137 Id. at 842-43.
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Thanksgiving Day to New Years Day, where all expressive activity is
prohibited;' 38 prior approval of signs and pamphlets; 139 and a require-
ment of insurance and cleaning/damage deposits.' 40
1. PruneYard and the Simulated Neighborhood
The PruneYard holding has also been tested in the context of gated
communities.' 4 ' For example, the plaintiff in Laguna Publishing Co. v.
Golden Rain Foundation wished to distribute free newspapers to re-
sidents that lived inside Leisure World, a private gated community.'
42
Leisure World allowed the distribution of another free paper within its
gates, but forbade access to Laguna Publishing. 43 The California Su-
preme Court held that Laguna Publishing had a right to distribute its
paper inside the Leisure World community.144 The court relied heavily
on Prune Yard's reasoning that First Amendment rights should be al-
lowed to evolve as societal conditions change, and that the state has the
power to regulate private property to meet this need: "the ingenuity of
the law will not be deterred in redressing grievances which arise, as here,
from a needless and exaggerated insistence upon private property rights
incident to [gated] communities."' 45 But the holding in this case cannot
be construed as generally allowing a free speech right in gated communi-
ties. Rather, Laguna holds that where a gated community opens itself to
one particular speaker, it may not exclude other speakers who wish to
express themselves in an identical manner. In other words, gated com-
munities may not discriminate amongst viewpoints or speakers.' 46
Although the outcome is favorable, the court's reasoning is prob-
lematic in several ways. The most obvious problem in relying so heavily
on PruneYard is that the public was openly invited to enter the
PruneYard shopping center. 14 7 Thus, the PruneYard decision relied
138 Id. at 843-44.
139 Id. at 844. The court noted that the Beverly Center required that signs:
"shall be two dimensional, neat in appearance, and compatible with the general aes-
thetics of the mall, shall not interfere with or directly compete with business displays
or logos, and shall not contain obscene, pornographic, patently vulgar, gruesome or
grisly material or displays, or highly inflammatory slogans likely to provoke a
disturbance."
Id.
140 Id. at 845-46. The court also considered a prohibition on interference with mall te-
nants, but did not reach a conclusion as to the validity of the prohibition. Id. at 854-55.
141 Laguna Publ'g Co. v. Golden Rain Found. Of Laguna Hills, 182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1982).
142 Id. at 815-16.
t43 Id.
144 Id. at 837.
145 Id. at 826.
146 See id. at 826-29.
147 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341, 344 (Cal. 1979).
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mainly upon the rationale that the public does not relinquish its First
Amendment rights when openly invited to congregate in a public
space. 148 Leisure World, on the other hand, is a gated community with
restricted access. 149 The court, however, dismissed this concern, stating
that while Leisure World did not invite the public, it did have many of
the attributes of a municipality. 150 Yet, the PruneYard holding did not
depend upon a "functional equivalent of a municipality" test. 15' Al-
though the Marsh holding is still valid, the Supreme Court has made
clear that a private entity must posses all of the attributes of a municipal-
ity before it is a state actor, including a business district. 152 The Laguna
court recognized its shortcomings and compensated by reasoning that
this was in fact a mixed case and looked to three factors in determining
that Leisure World was prohibited from excluding Laguna Publishing
from the gated community: (1) PruneYard envisions an expansive right
to regulate property in the interest of free speech; (2) Leisure World dis-
played many traits of a municipality; and (3) Leisure World discrimi-
nated against Laguna Publishing because it allowed other papers to be
distributed. 153
Laguna is not settled law in California. The California Supreme
Court subsequently held in Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway
Tenants Ass'n that the private property must be freely and openly acces-
sible to the public before the owner is required to recognize First Amend-
ment rights. 154 In Golden Gateway, the court reasoned that, because the
Golden Gate Apartment Complex had not issued a general invitation to
the public, there was no state action.1 55 Although the court expressly
declined to address whether gated communities are state actors,'
56 it
seems highly unlikely that that free speech rights will be extended into
such communities in California, as they clearly do not invite the public
onto their property.
B. NEW JERSEY
New Jersey has perhaps the strongest First Amendment protections
in the nation. In State v. Schmid, the New Jersey Supreme Court granted
the public the right to distribute political literature on Princeton Univer-
148 See id.
149 Laguna Publ'g, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
150 Id. at 824, 826-827.
151 In fact, the Pruneyard opinion does not include any discussion regarding the "func-
tional equivalent of a municipality" test. See generally PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74 (1980).
152 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518-21 (1976).
153 Laguna Publ'g, 182 Cal.Rptr. at 824-29.
154 29 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001).
155 Id.
156 Id. at 811.
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sity's campus.' 57 The court recognized the state's "strong traditions
which prize the exercise of individual rights and stress the societal obli-
gations that are concomitant to a public enjoyment of private prop-
erty."' 58 The Court, drawing heavily from the Marsh line of cases and
PruneYard, ' 59 formulated a balancing test whereby the courts would take
into account:
(1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private
property, generally, its 'normal' use, (2) the extent and
nature of the public's invitation to use that property, and
(3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken
upon such property in relation to both the private and
public use of the property.' 60
In 1994, the New Jersey Supreme Court accepted a shopping mall
case, N.J. Coalition v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.161 The court held that the
Schmid balancing test clearly worked in favor of granting the public a
limited expressive speech right in shopping centers.' 62 The court rea-
soned that, although the ultimate use of a shopping center is commercial,
such property also allows broader public uses, "almost without limit."'1 63
According to the court, the invitation for the public to use the property
was unqualified, and the speech (leafleting) was entirely consistent with
the use of the property-leafleting was no more damaging to a shopping
center than to a downtown business district.' 64 In fact, the court noted,
other shopping centers actually permitted the plaintiff to leaflet on their
property.' 65 The court stated that, furthermore, shopping centers rou-
tinely allow expressive conduct on their property, and thus are in a diffi-
cult position when arguing that this particular use is inconsistent with the
function of the property.' 66 Finally, the court recognized that rules gov-
erning free speech must evolve to meet social change:
If free speech is to mean anything in the future, it must
be exercised at these centers. Our constitutional right
encompasses more than leafleting and associated speech
157 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980), appeal dismissed sub. nom Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455
U.S. 100 (1982).
158 Id. at 630.
159 See id. at 629-30.
160 Id. at 630.
161 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994).
162 Id. at 760-61.
163 Id. at 761.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 764-65 (emphasizing that while defendant claimed to disallow expressive con-
duct on controversial issues, many of the mall tenants displayed posters supporting the Gulf
War, which was the very activity that the Plaintiff was trying to protest through leafleting).
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on sidewalks located in empty downtown business dis-
tricts. It means communicating with the people in the
new commercial and social centers; if the people have
left for the shopping centers, our constitutional right in-
cludes the right to go there too, to follow them, and to
talk to them.167
The holding in N.J. Coalition permits shopping mall owners to im-
pose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on free speech activ-
ities.' 68 Although the restrictions have not been as heavily tested in New
Jersey as they have in California, the holding in Green Party v. Hartz
Mountain Industries169 attempted to establish reasonable guidelines for
such restrictions. The Green Party court struck down restrictions that:
(1) would limit an applicant's expressive activities to only one day per
year; (2) required proof of a one million dollar insurance policy;' 70 and
(3) required the applicant to sign a "hold harmless" agreement that would
indemnify the mall owner for any losses related to the activity and pay
attorney fees in case of any litigation. 171 In doing so, the court refused to
use the "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest" standard that is
used to evaluate restrictions on speech imposed by government.
72 It
also rejected the lower court's vaguely defined "business judgment rule"
because the rule had "limited relevance in this context" and gave the
shopping malls too much power to prevent speech in the malls. 173 Sur-
prisingly, after having rejected two standards that have been carefully
formulated and articulated, the Court made no attempt to articulate a new
standard which would apply in shopping centers. The Court instead reas-
serted its original holding in N.J. Coalition that "'[t]he more an owner,
for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general,
the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and consti-
tutional rights of those who use it.' "174 The court recognized the "broad
authority" of shopping center owners to formulate regulations that mini-
mize the impact of expressive activities on the commercial operations of
the mall. 175 However, the court noted that any regulations chosen "must
be designed to achieve the mall's legitimate purposes while preserving
167 Id. at 779.
168 Id. at 783.
169 752 A.2d 315 (N.J. 2000).
170 Id. at 318-19 (noting that one of the plaintiffs received a quote of $655 from an
insurance agency for a one-million dollar policy to cover one day of leafleting in the mall).
171 Id. at 319.
172 Id. at 325-36.
173 Id. at 326-27 (noting uncertainty that "what is good for mall owners is... good for the
citizens of New Jersey who seek to exercise their free speech rights").
174 Id. at 327 (quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946))
175 Id. at 327-28.
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the leafleteer's expressive rights."'176 More recent New Jersey cases
evaluating mall restrictions on speech do not exist. Thus, it remains to
be seen how the New Jersey Supreme Court's common sense approach
will play out.
1. Schmid and the Simulated Neighborhood
Just as in California, free speech advocates worked to extend the
favorable free speech rules into new forms of residential living. The
Galaxy Towers in the town of Guttenberg provided the ideal tar-
get-l,076 condominium units above a shopping mall, 177 a sort of post-
suburban company town. The Galaxy Towers homeowners association
chose particular local politicians to endorse and then allowed only those
politicians to distribute campaign literature. 178 The Galaxy Towers re-
sidents represented nearly one-quarter of the local voters. 179 Not surpris-
ingly, the excluded politicians felt substantially disadvantaged. 180 The
court determined that the condominium complex met the Schmid require-
ments, and compelled the homeowners association to allow candidates
not endorsed by the homeowners association the right to distribute flyers
to the 1,076 units in the Galaxy Complex. 18 1 Galaxy Towers had made
distribution of fliers a normal use of its property, and thus the court rea-
soned that a public invasion caused by further distribution of political
fliers would be minimal.182
However positive the result here, Guttenberg does not create a gen-
eral rule allowing the public access to community associations for the
purpose of political speech. The court made clear that the situation in
Guttenberg was extremely fact-sensitive.18 3 At best, this case recognizes
a right of reply. 184 That is, where a private property is opened to a kind
of speech, it will be required to generally allow that kind of speech with-
out discriminating among different speakers.
It seems that a more determined court could have adopted the
Marsh holding completely in this case, finding that the property was the
176 Id. at 328.
177 Guttenberg Taxpayers & Rentpayers Ass'n v. Galaxy Towers Condo. Ass'n, 688 A.2d
156, 157 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996).
178 Id. at 156-57.
179 Id. at 157-58.
180 See id. (noting that politicians have consistently lost in other districts, yet won their
respective contests by "carrying overwhelming majorities" in the district containing the Gal-
axy Towers condominium).
181 Id. at 158.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 158-59.
184 See Askin, supra note 53, at 14 (noting that if the condominium association "decides
to cease handing out election materials to its members, the plaintiffs lose their right to
respond").
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functional equivalent of a municipality, as the Galaxy Towers did con-
tain the essential elements - a residential area and a business district.
Guttenberg did not resolve the question of how a court would rule if
faced with the problem of speech in an actual gated community, with no
similar business district attached. However, it seems that, if the property
opened itself to speech, it could be forced to refrain from discriminating
among different speakers. For example, if a gated community allows a
town's Democratic candidate for mayor to attend community functions
for political purposes, such as a community barbecue, it may not be able
to bar the Republican candidate from attending similar functions.1
85
C. OTHER STATES
At least twenty-one states have decided at least one shopping mall
case since the Supreme Court decided PruneYard in 1980.186 States
declining to extend citizens an expressive right in shopping centers
include Minnesota,' 87  Connecticut, ' 88  Pennsylvania, 89  Arizona, 190
Wisconsin, 191 Georgia, 192  Hawaii, 193  Iowa, 194  Michigan, 195  New
185 Interestingly, this test seems largely indistinguishable from the long-standing doctrine
of viewpoint neutrality employed by the courts in analyzing non-public fora created by the
state. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y. for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
186 Coffin, supra note 5, at 625.
187 State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793, 794-95 (Minn. 1999). The Wicklund case is
significant because it involved speech activity at the Mall of America in Bloomington, the
nation's largest mall. The Court failed to recognize any legally significant distinction between
the Mall of America and the modest shopping center at issue in Hudgens. See id. at 798.
t88 Cologne v. Westfarms Assoc., 469 A.2d 1201, 1202 (Conn. 1984). Connecticut has at
least one interesting PruneYard story. Before the Cologne decision, a trial level court granted
the local Ku Klux Klan a right to leaflet in a mall in West Hartford. A counter-demonstration
ensued and eventually SWAT teams were required in order to control the incident. Scott G.
Bullock, The Mall's in Their Court, REASON, Aug. 1995, at 46, 47.
189 W. Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Ct. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331,
1333 (Pa. 1986).
190 Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm., 767 P.2d 719, 720 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988).
191 Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832 (Wis. 1987). The Court based part of its holding on
the functions of a municipality test of Marsh, observing that "[f]rom the way the mall is
arranged and operated, the mall is much more like the old-fashioned department store than a
municipality. It concerns itself only with one facet of its patrons' lives-how they spend their
money." Id. at 845.
192 Citizens for Ethical Gov't, Inc. v. Gwinnett Place Assoc., 392 S.E.2d 8, 9 (Ga. 1990).
193 See Estes v. Kapiolani Women's & Child. Med. Ctr., 787 P.2d 216, 221 (Haw. 1990)
(holding that "[c]ontrary to the framers of the California constitution, the framers of our Ha-
waii constitution adopted language nearly identical to that of the First Amendment for the
protection [of] free speech"). But note that the property in question here was actually a hospi-
tal and not a shopping center.
194 See State v. Lacey, 465 N.W.2d 537, 539-40 (Iowa 1991) (holding that union mem-
bers did not have a free speech right to distribute handbills in a restaurant parking lot).
195 Woodland v. Mich. Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337, 363-65 (Mich. 1985) (holding
that the Michigan constitution "did not prohibit owners of large private malls from denying or
restricting access to private individuals seeking to exercise" their constitutional rights).
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York,' 96 North Carolina,197 Ohio, 19 8 and Texas. 199 For various reasons,
these states have chosen not to expand their state constitutional right to
free speech to cover speech in shopping malls. 200
But California and New Jersey are not the only states to recognize a
right to expressive activity in shopping centers. The Colorado Supreme
Court has found a right of access guaranteed by the Colorado State Con-
stitution. 20 ' The Colorado Court had an interesting two-fold reason for
concluding that the Westminster Mall is a state actor.20 2 First, the court
held that where there are significant tax abatements given to mall own-
ers, where there is a police station inside the mall, and where the mall
allows military recruiting on the premises, such government involvement
indicates state action. 20 3 Although perhaps a good policy, it is at odds
with Supreme Court decisions holding that government funding and con-
trol must be nearly exclusive for the private interest to be a state actor.20 4
Second, the court rehearsed the typical post-PruneYard "functional
equivalent of a downtown business district" analysis. 20 5 It still remains
to be seen how the Colorado Court will resolve the issue of "time, place,
and manner" restrictions that has arisen in California and New Jersey.
The court did indicate that shopping centers in Colorado could impose
restrictions "similar to those imposed on the other activities which it
ha[d] permitted in the past."' 20 6 This could open the door for shopping
centers to impose highly restrictive application requirements for speak-
ers, such as security deposits, proof of insurance, and "blackout days"
during which no speech is permitted.20 7
196 SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that a
mall owner could preclude leafleting under a blanket no-handbill distribution policy).
197 State v. Felmet, 273 S.E.2d 708 (N.C. 1981). But note that the defendant was charged
with trespassing while collecting signatures for a petition in the mall's parking lot, not inside
the mall's common areas. Id at 712.
198 Eastwood Mall v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59, 60-63 (Ohio 1994) (upholding an injunction
prohibiting "picketing, patrolling, handbilling, soliciting, or engaging in any other similar ac-
tivities" on the property of a shopping center).
199 Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 88-93 ( Tex. 1997) (finding that a
political party is not a state actor and could thus deny booth and program advertising space at a
state convention to specific groups).
200 See Coffin, supra note 5, at 625-33.
201 Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991) (holding that the free speech
clause in the Colorado Constitution prevents a mall owner from prohibiting nonviolent politi-
cal speech, as the mall has sufficient government involvement in its operation and the mall
functions as a "latter-day public forum").
202 Id. at 60-63.
203 Id. at 61-62.
204 See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (holding that there is no state action
by a private school even where nearly all of the school's funding comes from state sources).
205 Bock, 819 P.2d at 62-63.
206 Id. at 63.
207 See Union of Needletrades v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 838, 847-54. But see
Green Party v. Hartz Mountain Indus., 752 A.2d 315, 330-32 (holding that the requirement of
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Finally, Massachusetts has taken a limited approach to free speech
in shopping centers. Its state supreme court has provided for mall access
to persons seeking to gain the required number of signatures for putting
candidates on the ballot.20 8
IV. THE PROBLEMS OF PRUNEYARD
A. TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER RESTRICTIONS MIGHT CREATE
SUBSTANTIAL BARRIERS TO SPEECH
Even if the PruneYard holding were extended to every state, it still
would not be satisfactory. Even after a state court has approved a
PruneYard-style extension of First Amendment rights into shopping
malls, there are still numerous ways hostile judges could emasculate the
right to speech in privately-owned public space. In California, shopping
malls have made serious inroads through the use of more and more ag-
gressive time, place, and manner restrictions. 20 9 The Green Party case in
New Jersey also reveals the possibility of granting "reasonable business
judgment" discretion to shopping malls when establishing restrictions on
speech.210 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the "rea-
sonable business judgment" standard, 211 it remains a ready model for
judges in other states looking for an easy way to preserve shopping mall
owners' excessive property rights.
The California Supreme Court's holding in Robins v. Pruneyard did
provide that shopping malls could exert control over expression in the
mall through the use of time, place, and manner restrictions. 212 How-
ever, it was not clear from the opinion whether the restrictions imposed
by the shopping centers would be subject to the same level of scrutiny as
time, place, and manner restrictions imposed by government. 213 Subse-
quent decisions in California and other states have refused to apply the
same level of scrutiny to government-owned public spaces and privately-
owned public spaces.2 14
proof of a $1,000,000 insurance policy was excessive restriction of speech activities in a shop-
ping mall).
208 Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983).
209 See Union of Needletrades, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 838.
210 See Green Party, 752 A.2d at 326.
211 Id. at 326-27.
212 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979).
213 See id. Time, place, and manner restrictions on a government-owned public forum
must be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest." See Clark v. Cmty.
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
214 See Union of Needletrades, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 852-53; Green Party, 752 A.2d at
325-26.
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B. POLICIES DEFINING PERMISSIBLE REGULATION COULD UNDERMINE
PRUNE YARD
The holding in Union of Needletrades attempts to provide a ratio-
nale for giving shopping malls greater discretion to restrict speech
rights. 215 The court reasoned that: (1) unlike municipalities, shopping
centers do not have the benefit of statutory immunity from lawsuits and,
thus, they face greater exposure; 216 (2) "while the government has the
obligation to defend an unpopular speaker from a hostile mob, it is not so
clear to us that an equivalent obligation devolves upon a shopping
center;1 217 and (3) "[h]ere ... private property has been converted into
the functional equivalent of a public forum by a holding of the state Su-
preme Court. ' 218 The court concluded that Robins v. Pruneyard does not
require that a
shopping center's obligations vis-A-vis expressive activi-
ties completely mirror those of the government. Such a
conclusion would fly in the face of the reality that a
shopping center wears two hats: one is as a center of
commerce and the other is as a public forum located on
private property.219
This rationale is problematic on several points. First, shopping cen-
ters probably already insure against the sorts of damaging activities that
might occur as a consequence of speech activities. Indeed, one of the
most prominent rationales for allowing speech activities in shopping cen-
ters is that such use is compatible. 220 The concern that shopping centers
have no obligation to protect unpopular speakers from an angry mob also
seems unfounded. There is no evidence that police jurisdiction stops at
the shopping center entrance and no reason why police could not aid in
the protection of unpopular speakers inside the shopping center just as
they do in downtown business districts. Shopping centers may actually
be better equipped than other parts of a city to handle the protection of
unpopular speakers as there is usually a private security force employed
by the shopping center that could supplement police protection.
The fact that the common areas of shopping centers are not the
"quintessential public forums of streets, sidewalks, and parks" 221 hardly
seems relevant. The California Supreme Court held that shopping cen-
ters are public fora precisely because they so closely simulate the tradi-
215 See Union of Needletrades, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 852-53.
216 Id. at 852.
217 Id. (citation omitted).
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 See N.J. Coalition v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 761-62 (N.J. 1994).
221 Union of Needletrades, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d at 852.
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tional public fora. 222 The court's concern that private shopping centers
not be forced to "wear two hats" as a center for both commerce and
speech 223 also seems unwarranted. The traditional business district that
the shopping malls simulate "wears two hats," yet the presence of speech
activities does not hinder the primary purpose of the business district -
commerce.
PruneYard and its progeny also suggest a very messy balancing test.
As with any balancing test, the rule is difficult to apply and difficult for
businesses and activists to comply with. Indeed, the PruneYard stan-
dard-that as property becomes more open to the public, the more the
property owner's rights are circumscribed in favor the public's first
amendment rights224-may be one of the most difficult to apply, and, as
can be seen from the PruneYard litigation discussed above, the results of
applying this standard are neither entirely predictable nor entirely
consistent.
The problems outlined above all result from the fact that owners of
simulated spaces have a large degree of control over expressive conduct,
even in New Jersey and California. Thus, the exopolis or simulated city,
where there is virtually no publicly-owned public space, will, in the end,
be less free than the few remaining traditional cities. A superior rule
would hold that wherever the public is freely and openly invited to gather
for no particular purpose, the space will be considered public, and who-
ever owns the property will exert control as a state actor.
Critics charge that opening malls as public spaces would damage
the business viability of shopping malls, which are an important part of
many individuals' lives. 225 However, it seems unlikely that a general
rule as formulated above would drive simulated spaces into extinction.
Such spaces thrive in New Jersey and California, the two states that have
most seriously eroded property owners' right to exclude. If this rule ac-
tually did lead to the demise of simulated space and people returned
downtown, it would indicate that the simulated spaces thrived solely due
to their autocratic nature, that the only competitive advantage simulated
spaces ever had over traditional downtowns was their ability exclude
people who wished to exercise those rights most fundamental to a
democracy.
222 See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d at 346-47.
223 Union of Needletrades, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d at 852.
224 See generally Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); see also Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (stating that the "more an owner, for his advantage,
opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circum-
scribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it").
225 See Bullock, supra note 188, at 46.
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CONCLUSION
Simulated spaces exert a powerful hold on our culture. All reasona-
ble evidence points to the continued expansion of the exopolis and post-
suburban lifestyles. As these privately-controlled areas continue to re-
place open and democratic municipally-controlled spaces, public dissent
and protest may become impossible. The Constitutional right to freedom
of expression should be flexible to adapt to social change. The First
Amendment has changed in the past as new forms of governance and
property have. There is no reason to halt the evolution here.
It is a positive sign that California and New Jersey, the states where
simulated spaces appear to be most dominant, have sought to invigorate
the state constitutional rights to free speech and extend that right into
shopping malls and even, to some extent, into gated communities. Hope-
fully the Supreme Court will reverse its backward-looking decisions and
follow California, New Jersey, and other states in recognizing the right
of the public to engage in expressive conduct, wherever the public freely
gathers.
